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INTRODUCTION 
Mississippi and Louisiana plantation master Haller Nutt was a shrewd 
manager of his acquired property. The owner of over one hundred enslaved 
persons by 1843,1 Nutt was meticulous in his management of their health 
through various medical directives that he created, compiled, and issued to 
his overseers. One such tome, “Directions to in Treatment of the Sick,” 
instructed overseers on how to treat various ailments the enslaved suffered, 
including those related to enslaved women’s reproductive health.2 Nutt 
instructed: 
If a woman miscarries, which should never be the case in a well organized 
plantation, they should be treated as one that had given birth to a mature child, 
but allowed a longer time to stay in the house – kept longer in bed and nursed 
more carefully. – When women miscarry there is something wrong – she has 
 
 * Visiting Distinguished Professor of Law, UIC John Marshall Law School; Professor of Law, Mercer 
University Walter F. George School of Law. The Author thanks God for all things, her husband Mark 
Anthony Chubb for his love and bottomless well of encouragement, Professor Joy Kanwar for 
godmothering this piece, and Professor Bridget J. Crawford for all of the opportunities. 
 1 1843 List of Negroes on Araby Plantation, in RECORDS OF SOUTHERN ANTEBELLUM 
PLANTATIONS, microformed on ser. F, pt. I, reel 1, no. 00801, 204–05 (Kenneth Stampp ed., Univ. Publ’ns 
of Am. 1986). 
 2 Directions to in Treatment of the Sick, in RECORDS OF SOUTHERN ANTEBELLUM PLANTATIONS, 
microformed on ser. F, pt. I, reel 1, no. 00792, 195 (Kenneth Stampp ed., Univ. Publ’ns of Am. 1986). 
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been badly managed – worked improperly – or she has been to blame herself 
and should be seriously punished for it when she gets well. 
Women should be carefully attended to – and such as are in the family way 
should avoid ploughing– and such heavy work as fit only for men – women in 
[sic]family way are generally more free from disease than others, and when they 
are sick require particular attention – and all that is generally necessary is to 
keep their bowels open with castor oil – and sometimes require bleeding, which 
is shown by their pulse. 
When women complain of too much bleeding, you must attend to them – the 
regular and healthy courses [menses] last about one week – Enquire how long 
it has continued on her . . . .3 
The women who were the subject of Nutt’s prescribed care were his 
property. They were valuable for both their physical and reproductive labor, 
the latter more valuable as indicated by his admonition that enslaved women 
avoid plowing and other labor-intensive “men’s work” when they were “in 
the family way.” Nutt’s directives pertain directly to “female sexual and 
reproductive anatomy as it relates to what individuals experience, focusing 
on liberties and prerogatives recognized by the law”4—the very definition of 
autonomy that is the subject of Professor Anita Bernstein’s impressive and 
expansive book, The Common Law Inside the Female Body.5 
Bernstein is aware of the legacy of slavery in this country, but her 
present account does not consider the different ways in which the common 
law historically resided (and continues to reside) in the Black female body. 
In slavery, the Black female body had no liberty or prerogatives recognized 
by the law. Bernstein writes: 
Overall I find myself struck more by the differences, the disanalogy as it were, 
between oppression of persons brought to the American continent in chains 
from Africa and their descendants, on one hand, and oppression of women in 
the United States on the other, than the similarities. Unjust deprivations of 
fundamental rights—to vote, sue, own property, enter into contracts, and choose 
one’s employer and employment—certainly did connect otherwise different 
antebellum experiences, but this book has enough to report and assess without 
turning the enormity of slavery into a collateral topic.6 
Bernstein goes on to briefly explore, in about two and a half pages, 
some “parallels between slavery and [the doctrine of] coverture as they relate 
 
 3 Id. 
 4 ANITA BERNSTEIN, THE COMMON LAW INSIDE THE FEMALE BODY 22 (2019). 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. at 25. 
114:187 (2019) In Search of the Common Law Inside the Black Female Body 
189 
to the common law inside the female body.”7 She makes clear that her work 
will grapple almost exclusively with the contradiction of coverture and the 
concept of “condoned self-regard,” the ability to put oneself first, as a 
foundational tenet of common law.8 A key problem with this approach, 
however, is that enslaved persons were not genderless. Populations of 
enslaved women resided in the United States under the oppression of brutal 
slave regimes. Enslaved women, Black women, were deprived of the 
fundamental right to possess themselves because they were the property of 
slave mistresses and masters. Perhaps most importantly, the doctrine of 
coverture (espoused by William Blackstone and interpreted and expanded by 
judges)9 was part of a larger common law paradigm for family governance 
of which the plantation was necessarily a part. 
I. THE CONTRADICTION OF ENSLAVEMENT AND CONDONED SELF-
REGARD 
Sir William Blackstone, Bernstein’s appointed spokesman for the 
common law in The Common Law Inside the Female Body,10 posited the 
existence of three overarching categories of private relationships: master and 
servant; husband and wife; and parent and child (inclusive of guardian and 
ward).11 In his chapter on the relationship between master and servant, 
Blackstone explained that a slave becomes free the moment he arrives in 
England with the protections of the law, except when a master has already 
acquired the slave by contract.12 
Blackstone’s descriptions of master and servant make any condoned 
self-regard an enslaved person possessed subservient to her master’s by 
virtue of the “contract” between them. Although Blackstone’s language 
generated enough ambiguity about the nature of slavery and freedom to 
support litigation in English and colonial courts, judges would not stop the 
institution of slavery, even as Blackstone’s words arguably incubated the 
seeds of abolitionism to grow.13 Capitalism, it seems, was the organizing 
 
 7 Id. at 25–27. 
 8 Id. at 8, 21, 27. 
 9 Id. at 19. 
 10 Id. at 81. 
 11 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 272 (Wilfrid Prest ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2016). 
 12 Id. at 273 (“Yet, with regard to any right which the master [] may have acquired, by contract or 
the like, to the perpetual service of John or Thomas, this will remain exactly in the same state as 
before . . . .”). 
 13 See, e.g., William M. Wiecek, Somerset: Lord Mansfield and the Legitimacy of Slavery in the 
Anglo-American World, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 86, 87–88 (1974) (arguing that the Court’s decision in 
Somerset v. Stewart, which questioned the legality of slavery in England and its colonies, highlights the 
tension between the common law of slavery and the promise of liberty). 
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structure for the operation of the common law, a force that devoured 
England’s abhorrence of slavery at home and in its colonies. A common law 
of slavery, judicially made and socially condoned—law common to the 
inhabitants of what would become the United States and cobbled together by 
custom and judges—did evolve to protect an economy dependent on the 
physical and reproductive labor of the African enslaved.14 
Bernstein’s focus on individualist ideals makes condoned self-regard 
the centerpiece for how she understands the common law in the female body. 
Individualism historically links to capitalist principles. As law and 
economics scholar Svetozar Pejovich argues in Capitalism and the Rule of 
Law: The Case for Common Law, elevating the individual above the group 
(for what else is condoned self-regard?) encourages the individual to take 
responsibility for themselves, and to act in their own interests with 
autonomy.15 This “culture of individualism” is the lynchpin of a free market 
economy.16 Capitalism “require[s] a set of formal institutions strong enough 
to secure individual liberties, enforce private property rights, create 
incentives to reduce the transaction costs of exchange and maintain 
competitive markets.”17 The common law, as a part of the constellation of 
formal institutions and rules that maintain the culture of individualism, 
protects “individual freedom, free exchange, and private property rights.”18 
The common law is effective because it responds to changing economic 
conditions. 19 Capitalism materializes in the common law of slavery—law 
that was responsive to the labor needs of an imperialist nation. “Fellow-
feeling,”20 a way to understand another person’s harm, an understanding 
integral to Bernstein’s operation of the common law, cannot redeem it. 
Capitalism wrapped its common law arms around slave masters’ and 
mistresses’ condoned self-regard. Leaving the Black female body 
vulnerable, capitalism created for them a property interest in her person. 
II. BLACK WOMEN AND THE ENDLESS QUEST FOR NEGATIVE LIBERTY 
Bernstein’s understanding of the common law “inside the female body” 
includes the concept of negative liberty: “a right to refuse and reject” 
 
 14 William M. Wiecek, The Origins of the Law of Slavery in British North America, 17 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1711, 1776–80 (1996). 
 15 Svetozar Pejovich, Capitalism and the Rule of Law: The Case for Common Law, XV 
ENTREPRENEURIAL ECON. 7, 8 (2008), https://www.udg.edu.me/post/files/download/1279811417_9536
.pdf#page=7 [https://perma.cc/BB35-Q4WP]. 
 16 Id.  
 17 Id. at 9. 
 18 Id. at 12. 
 19 Id. 
 20 BERNSTEIN, supra note 4 at 34. 
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unwanted intrusions.21 She draws from philosopher John Locke’s theories on 
how a person acquires property ownership, namely by combining labor with 
“an object” to make it his own.22 Bernstein goes on to explain that property 
interests reside inside the female body, absent external exertions, in its 
reproductive organs and their abilities.23 She uses this theory to support her 
claims that female and male personhood are equal.24 In her words, “gender 
hierarchy is now external to the common law in the United States and so, in 
a legal system that treats women the same as men at a formal level, a person 
with a female body holds those rights to negative liberty that the common 
law furnishes to everyone.”25 However, enslaved women did not enjoy 
property rights inside of their female bodies. They did not have the legal 
authority to exclude slave masters’ unwanted intrusions inside their person. 
Slave owners contributed their sperm to fertilize Black women’s eggs and 
used Black women’s labor to create a property interest in her children—a 
textbook application of Locke’s theories on property. For this reason, 
Bernstein’s assertion that Lockean property ownership theory is consistent 
with the premise that adult women are persons not subservient to men is 
complicated by the lived experiences of enslaved women. Gender hierarchy 
may be external to the common law, but patriarchy, white supremacy, 
capitalism, and imperialism are not. 
With negative liberty comes a list of what Bernstein calls “Do Not 
Wants.”26 These negative liberties are: “Physical Trauma at the Hands of 
Another”27; “Invasions of the Interests We Think We Have in Land”28; 
“Confinement”29; “Encounters That We Perceive as Hurtful to Our Dignity 
or Tranquility”30; “Losses or Takings of Chattels”31; “Paying Money for 
Something That Does Not Please Us”32; “Being Told to Do Something in 
Furtherance of an Agenda We Don’t Share”33; and “marital rape.”34 Women’s 
 
 21 Id. at 22. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. at 23. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. at 33–55, 75–112. 
 27 Id. at 36. 
 28 Id. at 39. 
 29 Id. at 42. 
 30 Id. at 45. 
 31 Id. at 47. 
 32 Id. at 50. 
 33 Id. at 52. 
 34 Id. at 87. 
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right to say what they “Do Not Want” is nullified by voluntariness35; 
“consent”36; “undertaking”37; punishment for crimes38; and nominal 
injuries.39 Each of these actions and abstentions are racialized and gendered 
in the common law. 
Black women’s exercise of negative liberty is ever adapting to the 
evolving historical ripples caused by slavery and Jim Crow. Ask Sandra 
Bland if the violence she suffered by a police officer after he ordered her to 
exit her personal vehicle during a routine traffic stop was physical trauma.40 
Ask her if her response when the officer demanded she put down her 
phone—“I’m not on the phone. I have a right to record. This is my 
property”—entitled her to condoned self-regard as she asserted her property 
rights.41 Ask Ida B. Wells if her removal from a public rail car in 1884 for 
daring to sit in the ladies car was an affront to her dignity and tranquility.42 
Ask the members of the Black women’s book club “Sistahs on the Reading 
Edge,” all of them removed from the Napa Valley Wine Train in 2015 for 
disturbing White passengers, the same.43 Ask Ruby Bridges if her consent to 
integrate her New Orleans elementary school at six years old gave her White 
classmates and their parents permission to spit on her, throw things at her, 
and otherwise inflict her with harm.44 Ask any Black woman whether they 
have been subject to the list of “Do Not Wants,” and the answer certainly 
will be yes. A nuanced picture of the obstacles to Black women’s exercise 
of negative liberties must take into account that their very bodies—encoded 
by race, class, gender, and sexuality—are often taken as evidence of consent 
to the “Do Not Wants,” as volunteering for abuse, and deserving 
criminalization. Black women’s injuries are not nominal; Bernstein would 
agree. Accordingly, the function, role, and value of the common law inside 
the female body may depend on the relationship of that body to white 
supremacy, capitalism, and imperialism in social and historical context. 
 
 35 Id. at 57. 
 36 Id. at 58. 
 37 Id. at 61. 
 38 Id. at 66. 
 39 Id. at 71. 
 40 Paul J. Weber & Clarice Silber, Sandra Bland’s Own Video of 2015 Texas Traffic Stop Surfaces, 
ASSOC. PRESS (May 7, 2019), https://www.apnews.com/1a92859cc6d54b0bb23dc1b6a6e30e36 
[https://perma.cc/N8Q6-R9G3]. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Chesapeake, Ohio & Sw. R.R. Co. v. Wells, 85 Tenn. 613, 613 (1887). 
 43 Complaint at ¶ 32–47, Johnson v. Napa Valley Wine Train, Inc., 2015 WL 5768562 (N.D. Cal. 
Oct. 1, 2015) (No. 15-cv-04515). 
 44 See generally RUBY BRIDGES, THROUGH MY EYES (1999). 
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III. EQUAL RIGHTS UNDER THE LAW, BUT NOT IN THE BLACK FEMALE 
BODY 
In The Common Law Inside the Female Body, Bernstein argues that 
formal equality for women began with racial equality for African 
Americans.45 Yet the implicit timeline is confusing. The Author fixes the 
beginning of formal equality for women in the mid-nineteenth century push 
for married women to own and control their property—for such control is 
the centerpiece of legal personhood in the common law.46 While married 
women’s ability to own property did give them increased wealth and 
autonomy,47 much of this wealth and autonomy came at the expense of 
enslaved women. As a preliminary matter, marriage in the nineteenth century 
was not a choice or right for all, but a privilege primarily reserved for White 
people.48 Slave marriages were not legally recognized, which left enslaved 
women, men, and children subject to separation or worse, depending on the 
economic needs of their masters and mistresses.49 Slavery was alive and well 
in the antebellum Americas. As historian Stephanie E. Jones-Rogers argues 
in They Were Her Property: White Women as Slave Owners in the American 
South, White women were active participants in slavery and benefitted from 
it financially, as they were more likely to inherit enslaved persons than real 
property.50 For many White, wealthy women, the centerpiece of their legal 
identity under the common law was the autonomy they received from 
owning and controlling Black female bodies. In the post-Emancipation and 
Jim Crow eras, in the Civil Rights Era, and in the age of #MeToo, the 
ownership rights to what lies inside the Black female body remain contested. 
CONCLUSION 
As scholars engage Professor Bernstein and her perspective on the 
common law, they must continue to wrestle with its antithetical approaches 
to slavery and freedom—especially when the common law “freedom” is the 
 
 45 BERNSTEIN, supra note 4, at 89 (citing Vicki Lens, Supreme Court Narratives on Equality and 
Gender Discrimination in Employment: 1971–2002, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 501, 520 (2004)). 
 46 BERNSTEIN, supra note 4, at 96–98. 
 47 Id. at 98. 
 48 Teri A. McMurtry-Chubb, “Burn This Bitch Down!”: Mike Brown, Emmett Till, and the Gendered 
Politics of Black Parenthood, 17 NEV. L.J. 619, 622–24 (2017); Teri A. McMurtry-Chubb, Loving v. 
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), in FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: REWRITTEN OPINIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 
SUPREME COURT 119, 119–36 (Kathryn M. Stanchi et al. eds., 2016). 
 49 McMurtry-Chubb, “Burn This Bitch Down,” supra note 48. See generally TERA W. HUNTER, 
BOUND IN WEDLOCK: SLAVE AND FREE BLACK MARRIAGE IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (2017). 
 50 STEPHANIE E. JONES-ROGERS, THEY WERE HER PROPERTY: WHITE WOMEN AS SLAVE OWNERS 
IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH xi–xvii (2019). The focus of Dr. Jones-Rogers’ study is on married women 
who owned slaves. Id. 
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right to put oneself first. If, as Bernstein argues, the common law inside the 
female body encompasses “freedom from much more than freedom to,”51 
then a change in perspective is warranted for the common law inside an 
enslaved Black female body held as property, raped, and bred at the whim of 
slave masters and mistresses, with no control over the children she birthed. 
This history invites inquiry into what common law can reside in the modern 
Black female body for which the promise of formal equality remains elusive. 
The search for the common law inside the Black female body begins a search 




 51 BERNSTEIN, supra note 4, at 7 (emphasis in original). 
